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ABSTRACT: This is a methodological paper which addresses three distinct ways in which
metaphor can be found in discourse. The first approach concerns the Pragglejaz method for
finding metaphorically used words, which involves the canonical case of metaphor
identification in cognitive linguistics. The second approach concerns one way in which it is
possible to go from words identified as metaphorically used to their related underlying
conceptual structures, by means of a five-step procedure. And the third approach focuses on
other linguistic forms of expression of metaphor as an underlying cross-domain mapping in
conceptual structure, such as simile and analogy. All three approaches are discussed with
reference to their application in empirical research on corpus data.
Keywords: metaphor identification, indirect language use, similarity, incongruity, method.
RESUMEN: Este artículo metodológico se centra en los diferentes modos en que el fenómeno
de la metáfora puede aparecer en el discurso. El primer enfoque trata el método Pragglejaz
para identificar palabras usadas metafóricamente, incluyendo el caso canónico de la
identificación de metáforas en la lingüística cognitiva. El segundo enfoque describe,
mediante un proceso de cinco pasos, una posible forma de acceder a la estructura conceptual
subyacente a palabras cuyo uso se ha identificado como metafórico. El tercer enfoque se
centra en otras formas lingüísticas de expresar la metáfora concebida como un mapeo
subyacente entre dominios en la estructura conceptual, como son el símil o la analogía. Estos
tres enfoques se analizan en torno a su aplicación a la investigación empírica en datos de
corpus.
Palabras clave: identificación de metáforas, uso indirecto del lenguaje, semejanza,
incongruencia, método.
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1. Metaphor Identification in Discourse
The identification of metaphor has at least partly been regarded as a matter of
finding indirect meaning by both Lakoff (1986, 1993) and Gibbs (1993, 1994). Thus,
when somebody says Sam is a gorilla, and their utterance does not apply to a gorilla but
to a human being, the word gorilla has been used indirectly to convey a meaning that
differs from its basic, direct application. This is the case even though the contextual
meaning of gorilla that we have to do with here has become so conventionalized that it
has ended up in an advanced learners’ dictionary like Macmillan’s. This is a dictionary
which is based on corpus research, suggesting that the metaphorical meaning may be
found frequently enough for it to need description as a conventionalized meaning of the
term. The use is analyzed as designating “a big man who seems stupid or violent”.
Metaphor may hence be conventionalized to the degree that it becomes part of the
language code, at least as this is reflected in cultural repositories such as dictionaries and
grammars. Indeed, the conventional nature of linguistic metaphor has been one of the
main points of cognitive linguistic research on the phenomenon, and numerous examples
have been provided which show that metaphor is part and parcel of our language system
and its use (e.g. Lakoff; Johnson, 1980, 1999). This is one of the interesting changes in
linguistic metaphor research of the past 25 years, shifting metaphor from its time-
honored position of novel and deviant language use to the conventional and the regular.
Conventionalization of metaphor does not mean that it cannot be distinguished
from equally conventional non-metaphorical language. It is still possible to make a
distinction between the direct and indirect application of a word, or more generally
expression, in an utterance. Not many people will deny that gorilla has a basic sense
which can be directly applied to one sort of referent, a type of ape, as opposed to a
derived, metaphorical sense, which can only be indirectly applied to another sort of
referent, human beings. Metaphor as indirect meaning and use also holds for other
animal metaphors, like pig and bitch, and for all other metaphors that have been
described under such rubrics as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, HAPPY IS UP, or BUSINESS IS WAR. This
is the reason why Lakoff, Gibbs and others have adhered to a criterion of indirectness
(or to the related notion of incongruity, as in, e.g., Cameron, 2003; Charteris-Black,
2004; cf. Steen, 2007).
Indirectness may be a good starting point for finding metaphor in language, but it
is not sufficient. It is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because metaphor is
also based on a salient distinction and contrast between the two semantic or conceptual
domains involved in the expression, which then also needs to be bridged by some form
of semantic transfer from the one domain to the other on the basis of similarity (cf.
Cameron, 2003). Thus, Sam is a gorilla can be given a metaphorical analysis because it
involves a contrast between the domain of gorillas and humans which may be bridged
by constructing a similarity between the two. This is different than another form of
indirectness, metonymy, where two domains may be contrasted but where the contrast is
resolved by contiguity instead of similarity. Thus, in The White House made the
announcement yesterday, there is a contrast between the domain of buildings and the
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people that occupy them, causing a form of indirect meaning. But this is not resolved by
metaphorical transfer, but metonymic transfer, via the contiguous relationship between
houses and their occupants (for further discussion of metaphor versus metonymy, and
similarity versus contiguity, see Dirven and Pörings, 2002).
The criterion of indirectness is also too narrow to capture all linguistic forms of
expression of metaphor. If metaphor is defined as a conventional or less conventional
mapping across two conceptual domains, as has become customary in cognitive
linguistics, it is easy to show that such cross-domain mappings may also be realized by
direct language use. Thus, simile and a lot of analogy employ their language in direct
ways, in that the words are related to concepts which are directly connected to the
intended referents in the text world. One illustration may be provided by the following
line from a song by Bruce Springsteen (“I’m on fire”): Sometimes it’s like someone took
a knife, baby, edgy and dull, /And cut a six-inch valley through the middle of my soul.
This is a form of a cross-domain mapping which is expressed directly when it comes to
relations between words, concepts, and referents: as listeners, we do need to build a text
world that contains a knife and a process of cutting in the soul. However, it is also clear
that subsequent conceptual analysis has to be done to recover the intended meaning of
this cross-domain mapping. Such figures do not use language indirectly but still express
metaphorical mappings at a conceptual level of analysis. An inventory of these various
forms of metaphor has been proposed by Goatly (1997) and their cognitive linguistic
interpretation has been at the centre of attention in Conceptual Integration Theory
(Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).
The identification of metaphor in language and its use is hence fraught with
difficulties (Steen, 2007). In this paper I will discuss some of the issues involved, and
report on some of the methodological work I have carried out in various contexts. I will
begin with the development and application of the Pragglejaz procedure for finding
metaphorically used words in natural discourse, called MIP, which caters for the most
frequent expression of metaphor in conceptual structure by metaphorical language
(Pragglejaz Group, 2007; Steen, 2002 a, 2005 a; Steen, et al., in press). Then I will
continue with one way in which analysts can become more precise in identifying the
meaning of a metaphor as a conceptual cross-domain mapping (Steen, 1999, in press;
Semino et al., 2004). And finally I will consider some of the issues that arise when
metaphors are not expressed indirectly but directly (Steen, 2007, in press). The latter two
sections are two ways in which this paper goes beyond the Pragglejaz method, which
explains the title of the paper.
2. The Pragglejaz Method for Finding Metaphorically Used Words
The Pragglejaz Group is an international collective of metaphor researchers who
joined forces to examine whether it was possible to devise an explicit and precise
method for canonical metaphor identification in discourse. Their name has been derived
from the initial letters of their first names:
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P eter Crisp, Chinese University Hong Kong, China
R ay Gibbs, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
A lan Cienki, VU University (Amsterdam) Netherlands
G raham Low, University of York, UK
G erard steen, VU University (Amsterdam) Netherlands
L ynne Cameron, Open University (Milton Keynes), UK
E lena Semino, Lancaster University, UK
J oe Grady, Cultural Logic LLC (Washington DC), USA
A lice Deignan, University of Leeds, UK
Z oltán Kövecses, Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), Hungary
The group has collaborated for six years and attempted to develop a tool for
metaphor identification in natural discourse that is both reliable as indicated by statistical
tests and valid in that it attempts to make explicit how it makes use of current empirical
research in cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis, psycholinguistics, and applied
linguistics. The group has published its procedure as Pragglejaz Group (2007; cf. Steen,
2002 a, 2005 a.
The Pragglejaz group started out on the basis of a preliminary theoretical
conceptualization of the nature of the method (Steen, 2002 b). This conceptualization
involved three issues, including making a choice for a particular theoretical framework,
for which a combination was envisaged of the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor
with a broad view of discourse analysis. It also implied a decision about the model for
metaphor within that theoretical framework, for which the Lakoff and Johnson view of
metaphor as a cross-domain mapping was chosen. And a further decision had to be made
about the unit of analysis to be adopted, for which the word (or more accurately, the
lexical unit) in relation to concepts and referents was preferred (cf. Crisp, Heywood, et
al., 2002).
Having determined the theoretical framework for the methodological project, an
attempt was made to formulate a procedure for metaphor identification. Tentative
versions were used for application, testing, and revision, and the final version has now
been reported, with a modest reliability test, in Pragglejaz Group (2007). The procedure
looks like this:
1. Read the whole text or transcript to understand what it is about.
2. Decide about the boundaries of words.
3. Establish the contextual meaning of the examined word.
4. Determine the basic meaning of the word (most concrete, human-oriented and
specific).
5. Decide whether the basic meaning of the word is sufficiently distinct from the
contextual meaning.
6. Decide whether the contextual meaning of the word can be related to the more basic
meaning by some form of similarity.
After a number of trial reliability tests over the previous years, the goal of
publishing the procedure led to its independent application by six analysts to two pieces
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of discourse of about 675 words each, one news text and one conversation from the
British National Corpus. The reliability of the results was reasonable. About 85% of the
words in the conversation and about 75% of the words in the news text were
unanimously judged to be not metaphorical by all six analysts. Unanimous agreement
between all six judges about metaphorical use was obtained for 4% of the words in the
conversation, and 7% of the words in the news text. In all, then, there was unanimity
about the analysis by six independently operating analysts for 89% and 82% of the cases.
If criteria of success are relaxed to include cases where five independently operating
analysts agreed with each other about metaphorical or non-metaphorical use, these
percentages rise to 93.1 and 91.1, respectively. When these analysts get together to
discuss the remaining cases of disagreement, the figures become even more positive.
An example of a stretch of discourse where there was unanimous agreement about
non-metaphorical usage according to the criteria of the procedure is the following
excerpt from the conversation:
A: So you deny all the studies that prove that...
B: No
A: ... conclusively?
B: And what I’m saying is that...
A: Do you deny those studies?
B: What I’m saying is that y— I probably do <unclear> deny those studies.
Each of these words is not used metaphorically in the sense defined above.
An example of a stretch of discourse where all judges agreed that most of the words
were not metaphorically used, but two were, is the following (the number of positive
identifications is included in brackets behind the relevant word):
What i— emerges(6) is depression(6) is a common condition which is under-diagnosed
and under-treated.
When we apply the Macmillan dictionary to this excerpt, the verb emerge has a
contextual meaning of “to become known”, but a more basic meaning of “to come out
of something or out from behind something”. The latter is more basic because it is
concrete, as opposed to the abstract meaning of the former. The two senses are distinct,
as is reflected by their separate numbering in the dictionary. And they can be related by
similarity: when an idea or fact becomes known to people, it is comparable to the
physical emergence of a concrete entity. Similarly, depression in this context means “a
feeling of being extremely unhappy”, but its basic meaning designates “an area on a
surface that is lower than the parts around it”. Again, there is a contrast between the
physical and the abstract, and this may be bridged by means of the mapping UNHAPPY IS
DOWN.
It is interesting to note here that indirect, contextual meanings do not have to be less
frequent than direct, basic meanings. For instance, the emotional sense of depression is
listed as its first, most common sense by Macmillan. Another complication has to do
with the register value of a word. Thus, the concrete basic sense of depression is listed
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as being formal as opposed to general language use. However, the presence of both
senses in the dictionary suggests that they are part of the current language system, albeit
with different values, and their joint presence enables their juxtaposition as direct and
indirect meanings, of which the latter is based in similarity and therefore metaphor.
An example of a stretch of discourse with less unanimity is the following:
President Bush the elder’s ‘new world order(2)’ led(6) to(4) the establishment, for the first
time, of a Palestinian government, the Palestinian National Authority, on Palestinian soil, and
the establishment of diplomatic relations between(3) Jordan and Israel.
Three words are seen as potentially metaphorical by less than five of the six judges:
to, between, and order. Two of these concern prepositions, which are rather difficult
when it comes to fixing their basic meanings without further theoretical discussion.
Moreover, to is preceded by the heavily metaphorical verb led, which may have had an
impact on its perception as metaphorically used by some analysts.
Less clear cases may be due to analytical error. But they may also be due to the
complexities of metaphor and language use. They have proven to be extremely
instructive for the improvement of the procedure and its theoretical shoring up.
Methodological research is crucial for both theoretical as well as empirical work on
metaphor, and it helps increase the reliability and validity of the findings.
The Pragglejaz procedure has been adopted in two research programs on metaphor
in natural discourse at the VU University Amsterdam. The first program is called
“Metaphor in discourse: Linguistic forms, conceptual structures, and cognitive
representations”, with four PhD researchers and myself, and runs from September 2005
through August 2010. In the first stage of this program we have analyzed four samples
of 50,000 words from a publicly available sample from the British National Corpus,
called BNC-Baby. The four samples involve conversation, news, fiction, and science
texts.
The second program is called “Conversationalization of public discourse”, has the
same timing, and involves one other PhD researcher. In the first stage of the second
program, two samples of in total 100,000 words were analyzed from two Dutch corpora
in one coherent metaphor project. The two registers here are conversation and news.
Both programs have employed the Pragglejaz procedure as part of more encompassing
method for metaphor identification which we will touch upon in the rest of this paper.
The Pragglejaz procedure has turned out to provide a useful starting point for the
corpus-linguistic work which we have begun to do in our two research programmes
(Steen, Biernacka, et al., in press). The procedure has shown to be generally applicable
to large samples of British English and Dutch. We are also achieving high levels of
reliability. But our practical experience has suggested one or two issues which we have
had to solve in different ways than those proposed by the Pragglejaz Group.
One issue has to do with the definition of lexical units. The Pragglejaz Group have
defined lexical units rather broadly. For instance, they do not make a distinction between
the noun squirrel and the verb squirrel as separate lexical units. This is to be able to say
that the verbal form of the word is a metaphorical manifestation of a basic sense that can
be found in the noun. This can only be done if both senses relate to the same lexical unit.
As a result, lexical units are defined in this broad way.
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In our application of the method, we have limited the notion of lexical unit to the
relevant grammatical category. We do not treat word forms as lexical units, but only
consider as units those grammatical categories and subcategories which can be used to
express the same type of referent in discourse, that is, grammatical word classes (verbs
to indicate actions or process, nouns to express entities, and so on). This means that we
cannot mark the verb squirrel as metaphorically used, because there is no more basic
sense for that lexical unit with which the contextual verbal sense may be contrasted and
compared. The same holds for the conventionalized adjectival use of the noun key, as in
a key variable: this, too, cannot be marked as metaphorical in our approach.
It is important to understand what we are doing here. We are not denying that there
is a metaphorical relationship between the two different manifestations of squirrel or key.
What we are denying is that these are metaphorical relationships in use. To us, they are
metaphorical relationships in the language system, which may be described by
morphological analysis. Such morphological relationships may even have effects on
language processing. However, they are not due to metaphor in use, which we (and the
Pragglejaz Group) have defined as pertaining to the direct or indirect expression of a
referent by a word. Since the basic meaning of the adjective key is simply “important”,
if its description in advanced language learners’ dictionaries like Macmillan’s is a
reliable source, its referential application to an aspect of a variable is direct, not indirect,
for there is no more basic meaning for key as an adjective than “important”. Therefore,
as a matter of lexical use, key is not metaphorically used if the lexical unit is restricted
to the relevant grammatical category.
Another issue in our application of the Pragglejaz method has to do with the
historical dimension of language and its role in determining what counts as the basic
meaning of a word. In their definition of basic meanings, the Pragglejaz Group have
listed concrete human-oriented experience in one breath with historically older
meanings. Although this is a frequent combination, not all historically older meanings
are also the more concrete ones. Thus, a word like reinforce exhibits a number of
historically attested meanings (Oxford English Dictionary), of which two are most
relevant here (Steen, Biernacka, et al., in press): (1) to make a building, structure, or
object stronger, and (2) to make a group of soldiers, police etc stronger by adding more
people or equipment. It turns out that it is the latter, not the former, which is historically
older, by almost one century. The two criteria of concrete physical meaning versus
historically older meaning may hence yield different results for the analyst who needs to
decide about what counts as the basic meaning of a word. In our work we have therefore
emphasized a synchronic approach which privileges concrete, human-experience related
meanings, without denying that the role of the history of language needs to be verified
at a later stage.
There are other issues that also need to be commented on. For instance, the
identification of the precise contextual meaning of a word may be rather problematic in
conversations, which often become rather vague. By contrast, in science texts, the
precise contextual meaning of a word is sometimes highly technical and specialized,
which raises other questions. These and other issues are brought to the fore by the
consistent and precise application of the Pragglejaz method to large samples of data. We
are looking forward to uncovering many more of these details about metaphorically used
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words in the future, which may be facilitated by doing the corpus work which we have
undertaken at the VU University.
3. Beyond Pragglejaz (1): The Five Step Method
The cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor assumes that metaphors in language
use like the ones we have discussed above are expressions of underlying cross-domain
mappings which are part of the conceptual structure of language and discourse. The
question that arises for the analyst of discourse, therefore, is how we can get from the
linguistic expressions of metaphor in discourse as for instance uncovered by the
Pragglejaz method to the presumed underlying conceptual structures. I have suggested
that getting from the linguistic form of metaphor to its conceptual structure is a
fundamental methodological problem and have proposed a five-step framework for
addressing the issues involved (Steen, 1999, in press; cf. Semino, et al., 2004). Finding
metaphor in discourse is not just a matter of identifying metaphorically used words but
also of identifying their related conceptual structures.
My attempt at an explicit procedure for the conceptual analysis of metaphor
includes the following five steps:
1. Find the metaphorical focus
2. Find the metaphorical proposition
3. Find the metaphorical comparison
4. Find the metaphorical analogy
5. Find the metaphorical mapping
In this section I can only illustrate the basic mechanisms and assumptions that are
at work for canonical metaphor identification. For more complex issues, see Steen (in
press).
When Tennyson writes Now sleeps the crimson petal, it is obvious that the word
sleeps has been used metaphorically (cf. Steen, 2002 a). The Pragglejaz method would
say that it is not used in its basic meaning, which pertains to animate entities, but
displays another meaning in this context, designating some action or state of the crimson
petal which cannot be sleep. The indirect contextual meaning is analyzed by setting up
some sort of contrast as well as similarity relation with the basic meaning. One candidate
for facilitating that analysis is a cross-domain mapping between the domains or spaces
of plants and animate beings. Thus, the analyst would have to find some sort of action
or state for the crimson petal that corresponds with the situation where animate beings
sleep. One possibility would be to say that the crimson petal is inactive.
Each of these comments serves to point to different aspects of the analytical process
of deriving an underlying conceptual structure from the linguistic form of the metaphor.
These aspects are now presented in more ordered and formalized fashion with reference
to the five-step framework. Table 1 shows two columns, with the five steps displayed on
the left, and their application to the textual materials on the right.
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Table 1
Analysis of “Now sleeps the crimson petal”
Text Now sleeps the crimson petal
1. Identification of metaphor-related Sleeps
words
2. Identification of propositions P1 (SLEEPs PETALt)
P2 (MOD P1 NOWt)
P3 (MOD PETALt CRIMSONt)
3. Identification of open comparison SIM {∃F ∃a
[F (CRIMSON PETAL)]t
[SLEEP (a)]s}
4. Identification of analogical SIM
structure {[BE-INACTIVE (CRIMSON PETAL)]t
[SLEEP (HUMAN)]s}
5. Identification of cross-domain SLEEP > BE-INACTIVE
mapping HUMAN > CRIMSON PETAL
inferences:
GOAL OF SLEEP > GOAL OF BE-INACTIVE: REST
TIME OF SLEEP > TIME OF BE-INACTIVE: NIGHT
The first step concerns the identification of the metaphorically used words in the
text, and I have shown how this can be done in the previous section. Even though the
complete first utterance is the linguistic expression of a cross-domain mapping, or a
metaphor, there is only one word that is metaphorically used, and that is sleep. In
traditional terminology, it is the focus (Black, 1962) or vehicle (Richards, 1936) of the
metaphor.
When step 1 identifies metaphorically used words, it identifies terms which express
the focus, vehicle, or source domain of the metaphor. It does so by finding those words
which are somehow indirect or incongruous in context (e.g., Cameron, 2003; Charteris-
Black, 2004). Such words, like sleep, therefore form a potential threat to the coherence
of the text (Steen, 2002 b). However, when it seems possible to integrate them into the
overall discourse by some form of comparison or similarity which resolves the
incongruity, the words are somehow metaphorical, or related to metaphor. Step 1 is
hence explicitly based on the idea that metaphor is a form of indirect meaning that is
based on correspondence or similarity.
Step 2 involves the transformation of the linguistic expressions of the text into
conceptual structures in the form of a series of propositions. It makes explicit the
assumption that metaphor is a matter of thought, not language. This type of conceptual
structure for discourse is usually referred to as a text base, which has a linear as well as
hierarchical quality (e.g. Kintsch, 1998). In order to indicate its conceptual instead of
linguistic status, small capitals are used for its technical representation.
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There are several formats for this structure, and discourse psychologists are rather
practical about the ways in which text bases may be modeled to suit the purposes of
research. In our case, we have added subscripts to the concepts related to the words to
the effect that it is clear which concepts belong to the source domain versus the target
domain. This preserves the linguistic analysis in step 1, which made a distinction
between source domain and target domain language.
The third step transforms the single proposition with concepts from two distinct
domains derived in step 2 into an open comparison between two incomplete propositions
which each pertain to another conceptual domain. This can be done because we assume
that there is some form of cross-domain mapping between the two conceptual domains
framing the two sets of concepts distinguished in steps 1 and 2. Step 3 makes this
explicit. It states that, for some activity F in the target domain and some entity a in the
source domain, there is some similarity between the activity of the crimson petal on the
one hand and the sleeping of some entity on the other hand. Moreover, labeling these two
domains as target and source, respectively, suggests that the similarity has to be
projected from the sleeping of the entity towards the activity of the petal. These
assumptions lie at the basis of most metaphor analyses in the literature.
Several issues are implied by step 3. One involves the formal and conceptual
separation of the two domains or spaces already involved in step 2. Another concerns the
explication of the idea that was there from step 1, that we are indeed working on the
assumption that there is some sort of similarity or correspondence between the two sets
of concepts: hence the addition of the operator SIM. In addition, step 3 also postulates that
we will need corresponding elements on both sides of the equation, to the effect that
there is some activity or state needed for the petal in the target domain, and some agent
for the activity of sleeping in the source domain; hence the addition of the open function
and argument variables. These are natural additions if we want to align the two domains
in order to reconstruct the correspondences between them. They are, moreover, minimal
assumptions, in that no new conceptual elements are added to the comparison except the
ones that are implied by the original proposition.
Step 4 turns the open comparison proposed by step 3 into a closed comparison
which has the formal structure of an analogy (but in fact does not always need analogical
interpretation). The open values indicated by F and a in step 3 have now been interpreted
by the analyst. Step 4 thus makes explicit that analysts sometimes have to add new
conceptual substance to the mapping between the two domains in order to make the
mapping complete. This is often the crucial step of the analysis.
For this particular example, the fourth step also happens to be the least constrained
of all steps. Thus, on the side of the source domain, there is one option to fill in the
logically most encompassing candidate for the agent of sleeping, which would be
“animal”; and there is another option to fill in the most obvious candidate from the
perspective of human experience, which is “human”. Since the rest of the poem also
exploits personification and not animation, the example analysis has opted for the latter.
However, this is just for expository purposes. If the analysis aims to capture the meaning
of the text as it might function for a reader, then the first line might have to be interpreted
in the broadest fashion possible, because readers do not know yet what the rest of the
poem will do, and then the notion of “animal” might be preferable.
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A similar story can be told for the interpretation of the open target domain value,
but we will instead turn to the last step of the procedure. This step transforms the
analogical structure derived in step 4 into a mapping structure between two separate
domains or spaces. It explicates what has remained implicit in step 4, the precise
correspondences between the separate elements in each of the conceptual domains. This
does not seem to be problematic for our current example, but that is not always the case.
Step 5 can also add further correspondences which have remained in the background
of the analogy until now. Implicit elements of the sleeping schema may be projected onto
implicit elements of the crimson petal schema, such as the goal or function of sleeping
(rest) which may be projected form source to target to infer that the petal is tired. Or the
typical time of sleeping, night, may be projected from source to target to infer something
about the time of the real action of the poem. These are examples of inferences which add
minimal assumptions about the cross-domain mapping and, if they are accepted, enrich
the information that may be derived from it for the meaning of the text.
With step 5 we have completed our sketch of the five-step method. We have moved
from the identification of its linguistic form (step 1) through its propositionalization
(step 2) to its transformation into an open comparison (step 3), which was then
interpreted as an analogical structure (step 4) and fleshed out into a cross-domain
mapping (step 5). This procedure explicates various aspects of what analysts do when
they say that particular linguistic expressions in discourse are related to metaphorical
mappings.
The method offers a framework for further development which may lead to
similarly detailed procedures for the other four steps as the Pragglejaz method has
offered for finding those metaphor foci in step 1 that are realized by indirectly used
words. For instance, the analysis of propositions in step 2 involves an area of research
that has received much attention in discourse psychology and linguistic forms of
discourse analysis, and the variety of approaches is about as bewildering as the variety
of approaches to linguistic metaphor identification which was addressed in the
Pragglejaz project. Similarly, analogy, which plays a central role in steps 4 and 5, has
been the subject of quite a few psychological and computational approaches which also
require consideration before a suitable candidate or synthesis can be formulated. All of
these aspects are on the agenda for future research.
4. Beyond Pragglejaz (2): Other Forms of Metaphor
Apart from indirect word use, there are other manifestations in discourse of
metaphor defined as a mapping across two conceptual domains, such as simile, analogy,
allegory, and so on. I have noted before that simile embodies a distinct linguistic form
of metaphor in conceptual structure: it is not indirect language use but displays direct
lexical indications that a cross-domain mapping underlies the meaning of the language.
Finding metaphor in discourse does not stop at the border of finding metaphorically used
words, morphemes, phrases, or constructions: if metaphor is defined as a conceptual
cross-domain mapping and language usage is approached as grounded events of
discourse, then there is still more metaphor to be found.
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Consider the following world-famous sonnet XVIII by Shakespeare as a case in point
(Steen; Gibbs, 2004):
Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?
Thou art more lovely and more temperate:
Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May,
And summer’s lease hath all too short a date;
Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines,
And often is his gold complexion dimmed;
And every fair from fair sometime declines,
By chance or nature’s changing course untrimmed:
But thy eternal summer shall not fade,
Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow’st,
Nor shall death brag thou wandrest in his shade,
When in eternal lines to time thou grow’st.
So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.
The first line sets up a cross-domain mapping by evoking and contrasting two
distinct mental spaces, but does not use metaphorical language to do so. The words
activate the concepts of I, THEE, COMPARE, and SUMMER’S DAY, and each of these concepts
has a direct role in designating their respective referents in the world of the text. The
referents in the rest of the poem belong to two distinct conceptual domains or spaces of
discourse. One domain or space pertains to the addressee of the sonnet, and the other to
summer’s days. The point, however, is that both are directly expressed as text topics in
their own right. The reader is explicitly invited to set up and compare the elements of the
one topic to the elements of the other. This is a cross-domain mapping in usage which
does not exhibit indirect meaning as intended by Lakoff (1986, 1993) and Gibbs (1993,
1994): it is not the language that is being used indirectly, but there is one topic which is
used to talk about another topic in an indirect way.
As a result, lines 2 through 8 use language that, as a rule, may also be deemed
directly expressive of their subject: line 2 uses words that directly express the personal
characteristics of the addressee, whereas lines 3 through 8 directly express the properties
of a summer’s day. The lines do not contain metaphorical language in the sense of being
meaningful indirectly, as is the basis of the cognitive linguistic definition of
metaphorical language. Instead, they work as non-metaphorical expressions. They are
direct instructions for setting up conceptual structures in the domain of the beloved and
the domain of a summer’s day, respectively, and these conceptual structures require
cross-domain mapping by some form of comparative inferencing in order to achieve
textual coherence. If the analysts (and the reader) do not carry out these cross-domain
mappings, expressions like “more lovely and more temperate” turn incomplete while
“rough winds do shake the darling buds of May” lose their point. It may hence be
concluded by the analyst that such metaphorical mappings are part of the intended
conceptual structure of the text.
It should be noted, though, that the first seven lines also exhibit expressions that do
deviate from the locally dominant semantic field. Consider lease and date in line 4 and
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eye in line 5: these are indirectly meaningful when it comes to integrating them into the
local discourse topic of a summer’s day, which is dominant in these lines. To spell this
out for eye, the word activates the concept EYE which does not designate a referent “eye”
in the text world, for the text world does not deal with eyes but with summer’s days.
Instead, eye is indirectly meaningful; its semantic function for the complete text has to
be resolved by some form of analogizing in which the sun in the sky is compared to (or,
more generally, related to) the eye in the face of a person. If this does not happen, the
part of the text containing eye becomes incoherent. Words like eye and lease and date,
therefore, can be considered as local linguistic metaphors in the context of a more global
topic, summer’s day, which in turn functions as the non-metaphorical expression of the
source domain that the poem stages for conceptual mapping onto the target domain.
The incidence and interaction between these various forms of metaphor in
discourse is not restricted to poetry, although the intricacies of Shakespeare’s text may
be quite exceptional. In general, however, cross-domain mappings by means of non-
metaphorical language are typical of other types of discourse as well, such as education
and science (e.g. Gentner, 1982; Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993; Mayer, 1993). To give just
one illustration, consider the following scientific text from the early nineteenth century,
discussed by Gentner and Jeziorski (1993: 454):
1. According to established principles at the present time, we can compare with
sufficient accuracy the motive power of heat to that of a waterfall. Each has a
maximum that we cannot exceed, whatever may be, on the one hand, the machine
which is acted upon by the water, and whatever, on the other hand, the substance
acted upon by the heat.
2. The motive power of a waterfall depends on its height and on the quantity of the
liquid; the motive power of heat depends also on the quantity of caloric used, and on
what may be termed, on what in fact we will call, the height of its fall, that is to say,
the difference of temperature of the bodies between the higher and lower reservoirs.
The first section presents the cross-domain mapping by combining the two domains
within each of the various discourse units; the second section follows the opposite
strategy, and discusses each of the domains in its own terms and orders them from source
to target. Opposite orders, from target to source, may of course also be found. The
problems that these factors may create for metaphor identification by the analyst, let
alone for metaphor processing by the language user, have not been studied in any depth.
One fundamental question for all researchers of metaphor in discourse that is
involved here is the question of the unit of metaphor. Several researchers have pointed
out that this is a problem which requires more attention (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2004;
Crisp, et al., 2002; Goatly, 1997; Kittay, 1987; Musolff, 2004; White, 1996). It may now
be clear that this is because units of metaphor can be defined at the linguistic level as
well as the conceptual level, and both can happen in several ways. These are different
venues to operationalizing metaphor in discourse, and they affect the nature and number
of metaphors found in language.
Consider Croft and Cruse’s (2004: 213) examples of what they call simile-within-
metaphor:
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(1) a. Bizarre, angry thoughts flew through my mind like a thousand starlings.
b. She was standing there, her eyes fastened to me like steel rivets.
c. Grief tumbled out of her like a waterfall.
d. This is really twisting my brain like a dishrag.
From a linguistic point of view, each of these four sentences displays the same
pattern: their main verb is used indirectly to convey some sort of action or process
between two entities, and the adverbial adjuncts of comparison are used directly to
specify the manner of that action or process. The latter takes place by comparing it with
the way in which another entity than the one that is the topic of the discourse would
typically perform the action or process that is indirectly used. The linguistic analysis
would show that there are always these two parts of the cross-domain mapping, with the
first part always being a metaphorically used verb. This has to be opposed to the second
part, which does not display metaphorically used language but does express a cross-
domain mapping. The conceptual analysis would integrate both linguistic parts within
one conceptual mapping, with one source domain containing the verbal and the adverbial
elements, which would have to be mapped onto the target domain.
There might hence be three ways of counting the metaphors in these data:
1. only the verbs (metaphor as indirect language use)
2. both the verbs and the adverbial adjuncts, but as combination of two distinct
linguistic categories (metaphor as indirect as well as direct linguistic expressions of
conceptual cross domain mappings; Croft and Cruse’s category of simile-within-
metaphor)
3. the concepts relating to both the verbs and the adjuncts as belonging to one
conceptual structure (metaphor as cross domain mapping)
Analysts of metaphor in usage will have to explain which of these three options
they follow.
In sum, metaphor does not have to be expressed by indirect language use at all.
Goatly (1997) and Fauconnier and Turner (2002) are helpful sources for cognitive-
linguistically inspired discourse analysts who wish to explore this area of research, but
they have to take on board more general considerations of discourse analysis, for
instance pertaining to the identification of units of discourse at various levels of
measurement (cf. Steen, 2005 b). With corpora of conversations, news, fiction, and
science, we aim to make a beginning with a systematic inventory of the phenomena
involved, going beyond Pragglejaz in yet another way.
5. Concluding Comments
Metaphor identification in discourse may be pursued in various ways. In this paper
I have sketched three. 
The typical approach to metaphor identification in cognitive linguistics has focused
on metaphorically used words. I have suggested that the Pragglejaz method may offer a
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good tool for cognitive linguists who wish to make their results open for independent
comparison, and that its application in large scale corpus work has revealed several
issues that need to be addressed.
Another typical concern in cognitive linguistics with metaphor in discourse is the
relation between metaphorically used words on the one hand and cross-domain
mappings in conceptual structure on the other. Here I have suggested that the five-step
method may offer a promising framework for methodological study and application.
A third way in which metaphor may be found in discourse has to do with less
typical expressions of metaphor, by analogies and other figures. In cognitive linguistics
this area has above all been addressed by Fauconnier and Turner, but their work has only
begun to reveal some of the relevant aspects of the phenomena. Further theoretical and
methodological work is needed here to make progress that is consistent with the other
forms of metaphor identification discussed above.
In all, then, finding metaphor in discourse is an exciting and rapidly changing field
of enquiry. My attention to the methodological problems that are part and parcel of this
field has only one motivation: to improve the quality of our empirical research. For the
question is: when we say that we have found a lot about metaphor in language, are we
all talking about the same thing? If we do, we ought to be able to demonstrate this in
simple reliability tests where analysts come up with the same findings after they have
been given the same instruction. In my experience, this is an extremely hard but
worthwhile pursuit.
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